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How are political ideas to be conceived and interpreted? Foucault is a critic of 
standard ways of framing and analysing political ideas, just as he is a critic of 
standard ways of undertaking history and the history of ideas. However, he 
maintains that we cannot get at ideas by any means save that of interpreting their 
history. To frame political ideas as abstract representations either of how things 
are or of how things should be is, for Foucault, a misguided enterprise.  Relatedly, 
to consider history as either an expression of the potential of humanity, or as the 
register of progress is equally misplaced. Moreover, to imagine history as a record 
of the meaningful acts of individual or collective agents, which are to be 
recovered by hermeneutic forms of inquiry, is to inflate the claims of self-
conscious intentionality over the discursive frameworks, in which individuals are 
situated and by which reflective agency is constricted. Foucault’s critique of 
autonomous agency underpins his critical perspective on standard ways of reading 
texts, which envisage authors to be their organising agents, who articulate ideas to 
express their thoughts on selected themes. An underlying and continuous aspect 
of Foucault’s critique of standard intellectual operations is his challenge to 
conventional notions of the efficacy of the human subject and of the collective 
agency of humanity. For Foucault, the power of agents and the agency of 
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humanity are formulas, which standardise ways of conceptualising events and 
practices so that the historicity of frames of thought and action is misperceived.  
In his late essay, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ Foucault follows Kant’s lead in 
determining how we are to regard the present philosophical standpoint. Like Kant 
he urges a critical perspective on the present, and hence registers his association 
with Enlightenment thinking, which has been questioned by contemporary 
theorists.1 Like Kant, he also takes the question of where we stand, and what we 
are to do to depend upon a critical engagement with the limits of our thinking. 
Whereas Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason, frames a transcendental reading of 
knowledge so as to set categorical limits to its truth claims, Foucault focuses upon 
the historical character of the present. He observes, ‘the thread that may connect 
us with the Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements but rather the 
permanent reactivation of an attitude- that is, of a philosophical ethos that could 
be described as a permanent critique of our historical era.’ 2 Foucault substitutes 
an historical critique of the claims of reason for Kant’s generic transcendental 
account of its limits.  He concludes, ‘…criticism is no longer going to be 
practiced in the search for formal structures with universal values, but rather as a 
historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and 
to recognise ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying.’3 
Foucault radicalises the critique of the claims of reason. The limits of reason are 
not susceptible of a general specification, as reason and critique are both historical 
                                                          
1 See, for instance, the critical  reading of Foucault in J. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity 
2 M. Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in M. Foucault, P. Rabinow (ed) The Foucault Reader 
(London and New York, Penguin, 1984), p.42 
3 M. Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in M. Foucault, P. Rabinow (ed) The Foucault Reader 




and subject to limits. What we have is a present that is to be critiqued via critical 
readings of the past and the generation of the present. Simons notes how 
retrospectively Foucault can be seen to critique the present by refusing to accept 
how we presently are. He observes, ‘Foucault’s refusal to be what we are flows 
from analyses of the limiting conditions that subjectify us.’ 4 
Foucault refuses to imagine human beings, either collectively or individually as 
being creators of their own destiny. On the one hand, there is no destiny, or 
lingering sense of fate to which a summative history of humanity can be aligned, 
and on the other hand, individuals are situated in practical discursive contexts that 
shape the ways in which they act and conceptualise their situations.   Foucault, 
from his early study of madness to late investigations of governmentality, 
highlights the historicity of discourses and of affiliated ways of acting. His 
construction of these historical discourses allows for a critique of the present. 
Human beings are constituted in particular, disjointed ways by the contingent 
concurrence of phenomena within discontinuous discursive practices. Awareness 
of this contingency and the malleability of human practices and attitudes allows 
for a critical perspective on the present.  It is submissive to frame perceptions of 
where and who we are via general notions of madness, punishment, discipline, 
sexuality and the state, which determine our conceptual world. These notions do 
not stand for universals that are to be understood via historically innocent 
philosophical analysis. Madness is a category that is created via contingent 
circumstances and ways of thinking,  just as punishment is not an unchanging  
continuum of ways of regarding and dealing with delinquents. Just as Feuerbach 
                                                          
4 J. Simons, Foucault and the Political (London and New York, Routledge, 1995), p. 2 
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deployed the transformative method to substitute human beings as the active 
subjects of a God hitherto imagined as controlling human beings, so Foucault 
reverses the ways in which discursive practices are related to their objects of 
concern.5 Madness does not set an ahistorical agenda for the ways in which 
categories of normal and abnormal people are imagined; rather, the ways in which 
madness is conceptualised and managed determines how people are categorised 
and treated. Throughout his career, Foucault, in changing theoretical idioms, 
identifies the historical specificity of theories and practices, which lack a generic 
truth outside of specific historical formulations. In his lectures on bio-politics, at 
the College de France in 1978-9, Foucault  reflects back on his career to observe, 
‘ You can see that all these cases (his historical studies) – whether it is the market, 
the confessional, the psychiatric institution, or the prison- involve taking up the 
history of truth from different angles…’6 
Foucault imagines the conceptual universe of human beings to be thoroughly 
historical so that there is no universal measure of human activity. Theory and 
practice are constructed. The constructed character of theory and practice is not 
resolvable into intended human thought and action. Madness, its confinement to 
the margins of society and its susceptibility to the discursive control of medical 
expertise, is the product of contingent discrete phenomena, just as the history of 
punishment is not to be absorbed into a process of the progressively humane 
identification and treatment of delinquents. Knowledge is neither innocent nor 
universal. In an essay entitled, ‘Prison talk’, Foucault observes, ‘…it is not 
possible for powers to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for 
                                                          
5 L. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity 
6 M. Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics – Lectures at the College de France 1978-1979 (ed M. 
Senellart) (London and New ork, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 35 
5 
 
knowledge not to engender power.’7 Foucault’s sense of the isomorphism of 
knowledge and power, his distinctive readings of the development of modern 
institutions, practices and theoretical standpoints and his deflationary conception 
of the agency of authors combine to establish a particular perspective on the 
character and development of modern political thought. The ideas of authors such 
as Hobbes and Locke are to be understood as exemplifying formative discourses 
of the modern world and yet Hobbes and Locke are not the authors of these 
discourses; rather, discourses of rights and the powers of the state frame the 
possibilities that are imagined in their thought. 
Foucault’s theoretical and historical perspective bears upon the question of the 
how the history of modern political thought is to be interpreted. It disturbs 
standard ways of interpreting political ideas and their development. First Foucault 
refuses a universal or summative history, which might serve as a frame for a 
general history of political thought. Throughout his career, he opposes the claims 
of Hegel and Marx to provide summative conceptions of the development of 
history. Foucault’s radical edge is sharpened against totalising views and his 
historical perspective is set against generic views of history. His perspective 
accentuates discontinuities of history rather than tracing the past’s on-going 
connections to the present. His critique of the present depends upon its 
contingency, which denies a teleological endpoint, and allows for the reframing of 
particular pathways. 8 As Butler observes, in surveying Foucault’s revisiting of 
                                                          
7 M. Foucault, ‘Prison talk, in C. Gordon (ed) Power/Knowledge (Brighton, Harvester, 1980), p.52 
8 See M. Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in M. Foucault, P. Rabinow (ed) The Foucault Reader 
(London and New York, Penguin, 1984), 
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desire in the context of the dialectic in ruins, ‘Foucault contrives to unmoor the 
dialectic from the subject and its teleological conclusion.’9  
If Foucault’s perspectivism undermines the Hegelian dialectical supersession of 
otherness or even the Kantian transcendental suspension of difference, then he 
also challenges the autonomy of authorship and the agency of authors.10 In his 
essay, ‘What is an Author?’ Foucault observes, ‘We are used to thinking that the 
author is so different from all other men, and so transcendent with regard to all 
languages that, as soon as he speaks, meaning begins to proliferate, to proliferate 
indefinitely. The truth is quite the contrary: the author is not an indefinite source 
of significations which fill a work: the author does not precede the work; he is a 
certain functional principle by which in our culture, one limits, excludes, and 
chooses…’11 For Foucault discourses do not depend upon authors, authors are 
aligned with discourses. Interpreting the history of political thought becomes a 
matter of attending to how ideas contribute to discursive practices that shape 
institutions and subjects, rather than recovering the meaning of authors via a close 
scrutiny of texts and contexts. Foucault’s radicalism breaks with standard 
assumptions of continuities in the history of political thought.  If he rejects a 
teleological narrative of its development, he also undermines notions of 
continuities in political identity. Texts are not a repertoire of alternative 
conceptualisations of politics, for there is no standard way of conceiving of 
                                                          
9 J. Butler, Subjects of Desire- Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth Century France (New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 
10 See G. Browning, 
11 M. Foucault, ‘What is an Author?’, in M. Foucault, The Foucault Reader, P. Rabinow (ed), 




politics. The very identification of politics depends upon contingent discursive 
frameworks.  
 
Foucault’s career embraces numerous analyses of discursive practices, which are 
conducted in a variety of idioms and focus on a plurality of subjects, yet 
collectively they constitute a critique of Enlightenment notions of the centrality of 
an ordering reason and of its instrumentality in tackling determinate political 
issues. Foucault’s studies of heterogeneous and contingent discourses challenges 
the sense that they may be comprehended by a synoptic form of reason and that 
issues of power are constituted within and managed by the apparatus of the state. 
Power, for Foucault, is discontinuous and ubiquitous and is not to be 
encompassed and addressed by a universal form of reason. Enlightenment and 
Post-Enlightenment theorists such as Kant, Bentham, Hegel and Marx are as one 
in assuming that a general perspective on past and present may be established by 
means of which questions of power may be resolved. For Foucault, there is no 
generic form of reason, which can be applied across time and discursive 
frameworks. Likewise, power is neither concentrated in a single frame, such as 
Hegel’s state, nor in a line of development, such as Marx’s  analysis of class 
divisions. Power is localised and capillary, and turns upon how subjects are 
imagined and framed in specific historic discourses, such as those on madness, 
delinquency and sexuality.  Authors may produce texts on political ideas, but the 
idea of the political is contingent and dependent upon historic discursive frames, 
in which thought and politics emerge as historical and dispersed rather than 
universal and generic. Foucault in Society Must be Defended  sets  political 
theorists such as Hobbes and Rousseau within historical discursive frameworks 
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and expressly dismisses their claims to provide generic answers to political 
issues.12  
 
When Foucault addresses and interprets past political thinkers, he does not take 
them at their word, but relates their thought to discursive practices. Hence in 
Discipline and Punish he interprets modern forms of punishment as breaking 
from preceding patterns of corporal punishment in providing a burgeoning set of 
disciplinary techniques. These techniques exemplify a Panopticism, which 
Foucault associates with Bentham’s Panopticon, his projected architectural device 
to deliver multiple forms of control and surveillance. However, Bentham’s design 
of the Panopticon is taken by Foucault to epitomise forms of disciplinary control 
and surveillance in ways that are not conceptualised by Bentham. Rather 
Bentham’s ideas and projects are constituted and framed by the developing 
discursive practices of modernity 13 In his late lectures on governmentality, 
Security, Territory and Population, Foucault focuses expressly on the history of 
past political thought. He imagines ideas as tracking and reflecting discursive and 
institutional frameworks, Foucault exerts a crucial influence in identifying the 
character of changing practices that set the frame in which authorial ideas are 
interpreted.  Hence he interprets a number of modern political theorists as 
articulating state policy in terms of ‘reason of state’, which is shown to reflect the 
development of an administrative, police state. The police state is a novel 
framework, which contrasts with a dynastic model, which underlies preceding 
                                                          
12 M. Foucault, Society Must be defended: Lectures at the College de France 1975/6 ed. M. 
Bertani and A. Fontana (London, Allen Lane, 2003) 
13 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1977)  
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political ideas, for instance, Machiavelli’s Prince. 14 In The Birth of Biopolitics 
Foucault develops a subtle reading of the ways in which neo-liberalism reflects 
the emergence of a developing civil society that provides the conditions for 
market activities and individual freedoms. In doing so he identifies how the 
theories of Smith, Ferguson, Hobbes and Locke track and register differing forms 
of governmental organisation. He also identifies how German Ordo liberals and 
the Chicago School of neo-liberalism reflect and articulate aspects of developing 
discursive practices. 15 
In what follows, the ways in which Foucault challenges standard readings of the 
history of political thought will be reviewed. His early archaeological readings of 
discursive structures will be examined so as to highlight his sense of the 
historicity of ideas and knowledge. Thereafter his genealogical inquiries into the 
deployment of disciplinary techniques and the onset of sexuality as a discourse 
will show how forms of power and frameworks of conceptualisation are dispersed 
and historical rather than concentrated and generic. His late analyses of discursive 
conceptions of governmentality will show his distinctive engagement with 
express forms of political thought. Along the way, the force of Foucault’s 
challenge to alternative forms of the history of political thought will be explored 
and comparisons made with contrasting modes of interpretation, for example with 
the Cambridge School and with Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Foucault’s originality 
resides in his form of deconstruction, which imagines political power and thought 
to operate in discontinuous and hetereogeneous ways that are neither reducible to 
                                                          
14 M. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977-1978 ed. M. 
Senellart (London and New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 87-115 
15 M. Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics – Lectures at the College de France 1978-1979 (ed M. 
Senellart) (London and New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 
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the terms of past actors and authors nor susceptible of a dialogue between past 
and present 
History, Discourse and Truth 
Amidst Foucault’s constantly changing vocabularies and theoretical paradigms, 
there is a consistency in his turn towards history, which, in a multiplicity of 
idioms, shows the historicity of theory and the lack of universal foundations for 
the concepts underpinning philosophical and sociological notions of truth. 
Thought, for Foucault, cannot be deployed as a general term, which allows for 
unwavering rational understanding of its objects. The scene is set by his first work 
on madness. In Madness and Civilisation Foucault neither assumes a universal 
notion of madness, nor a correleative notion of an essentialised reason. An 
emphatic way of rejecting a dichotomous reading of reason and madness is to 
show the changing formulations and treatments of madness, that is, to identify 
them as contingent expressions of discursive practices rather than to represent 
them as essentialist terms determining practice. Foucault destabilises notions of 
madness. Madness and reason are relativized. The focus of Foucault’s analysis is 
the transition from the Renaissance to the classical period of modernity. Whereas 
madness in the medieval world maintains ‘mad’ people as part and parcel of the 
community while excluding lepers, in the Renaissance the ‘mad’ are symbolic 
figures, whose strangeness renders them ambivalent marginal presences, who are 
deemed to be capable of profound insight. The status of madness is conveyed in 
the mythological ship of fools, on which the mad are imagined as undertaking a 
spiritual journey. This ambiguous respect for the mad collapses in the classical 
period, in which the mad, along with other marginal types such as vagrants, are 
incarcerated in houses segregated from normal life. Foucault maintains that 
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confinement took place on an immense scale, with the Great Confinement of 1656 
a heightened example of a general trend across Europe.  
Following the classical period and the exclusion and confinement of ‘mad’ 
people,  the ‘mad’ return to the human community. Initially they are the objects of 
a moral normalising therapy, but subsequently they become subjected to a 
developing discipline of professional expertise and medical techniques. This 
process of increasing medical objectification is also traced by Foucault s in his 
The Birth of the Clinic . 16 Whereas early psychiatrists such as Pinel are 
standardly seen to be humanitarian, Foucault highlights the coercive, judgmental 
regime to which the mad are increasingly subjected. He observes, ‘The asylum in 
the age of positivism, which it is Pinel’s  glory to have founded, is not a free 
realm of observation, diagnosis, and therapeutics; it is a juridicial space where 
one is accused, judged and condemned, and from which one is never released 
except by the version of this trial in psychological depth- that is, by remorse.’17  
Foucault critiques the presumed authority and moral neutrality of the medical 
regime to which the insane are subject, and he highlights its disciplinary 
objectifying aspects. The presumption of scientific authority follows from the 
self-identification of professionals engaged in the treatment of those who are 
categorised as mentally ill, but it is precisely this identification that is challenged 
by Foucault’s historical account of the mutability of categorisations of madness. 
Gutting observes, ‘Foucault’s account seems implausible only if we continue to 
insist that the identification of madness as mental illness is an objective scientific 
discovery. His history, however, suggests that the identification was, on the 
                                                          
16 M. Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic (New York, Vintage, 1975) 




contrary, introduced as a means of legitimating the authority of physicians...’ 18  
The plausibility of Foucault’s perspective derives from his imaginative 
destabilising of assumptions, which underpin the medical discourse. Moreover, 
Foucault is alert to how the dichotomisation of the mad and the rational, whereby 
the mad are assigned to the abnormal margins of the population, is symptomatic 
of modernity’s marginalisation of the dissonant and different. Normalisation, for 
Foucault, is central to the processes of modernity, which are supported by an 
Enlightenment rationalism, and which presume a scientific stable discourse. 
Foucault’s historical treatment of madness, however, highlights how disciplinary 
discourses of modernity constitute mutable, contingent ways of categorising and 
normalising subjects so that it is misconceived to imagine madness to be an 
enduring essential category, which is to be determined by stable scientific criteria.  
Foucault’s account of developing forms of conceiving and dealing with ‘madness’ 
is imaginative and plausible. Gutting in ‘Foucault and the History of Madness’, 
however, recognises how Foucault’s work has been criticised by historians for  its 
lack of supporting evidence. He observes, ’But on the “object-level” of specific 
historical facts and interpretations, the consensus of even favourably disposed 
historians, is that Foucault’s work is seriously wanting.’19 Foucault’s argument 
for dramatic and discontinuous shifts in the identification and treatment of the 
mentally ill lacks convincing evidential support yet contributes to his wider 
critique of essentialism and poses pertinent questions for the conceptualisation of 
mental illness.   
                                                          
18 G. Gutting, Foucault: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005), p.72 
19 G. Gutting, ‘Foucault and the History of Madness’,  in G. Gutting (ed) The Cambridge 
Companion to Foucault (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.50 
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Foucault’s early history of madness is of a piece with his general resort to history. 
History, for Foucault, is significant in establishing the contingency of 
conceptualisation, and for registering discontinuities and ruptures, which 
intimates the instability of the foundations of discursive formations. In The Order 
of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault elaborated his theoretical 
interpretation of conceptual formations. He set out his archaeological conception 
of discursive developments by reviewing the operationalization of historic 
discursive formations, tracing what can be said or not said in certain historic 
discursive styles.  The Order of Things consists in the study of modern thought 
from the end of the 17th Century to the present. It represents a focus upon the 
human sciences. Its focus is neither on the intentional agency of thinkers and 
subjects nor on the background contextual influences, which are taken up either 
consciously or unconsciously by thinkers. What Foucault aims at revealing is 
what McNay terms the positive unconscious of knowledge. 20 Foucault highlights 
the rules of formation of diverse discourses of a given period, which constitute 
what he terms epistemes. Epistemes are the unconscious forms of knowledge and 
rules, underlying a discourse in a specific epoch. They represent a priori sets of 
rules that are constitutive of knowledge at a given time. Unlike Kantian categories 
of the possibility of knowledge, these are historic categories, which allow for 
mutability and instability so that knowledge for Foucault is inherently historical 
and contingent. Foucault maintains, ‘In attempting to uncover the deepest strata of 
Western culture, I am restoring to our silent and apparently immobile soil its rifts, 
                                                          
20 L. McNay, Foucault: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994), p. 52 
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its instability, its flaws and it is the same ground that is once more stirring under 
our feet.’21   
Epistemes are not the object or subject of critical epistemological reflection, for 
they are taken to be anterior to reflections on knowledge; they are what make 
possible knowledge. They determine what can be thought and known, functioning 
by a mix of informal and formal procedures that articulate knowledge in pure and 
practical human sciences. Characteristically Foucault’s perspective does not 
rehearse standard categories of thought, as it transgresses against disciplinary 
boundaries.  It neither replicates the express discursive meanings of agents nor 
provides a bird’s eye teleological view of history. There is neither a settled set of 
procedures development nor a well-defined continuity leading to the truths of the 
present. The Enlightenment notion of a scientifically established truth is 
undermined by the historicity of Foucault’s argument. Instead Foucault proposes 
discrete frames of episteme operating in historic epochs that neither lead to nor 
emanate from an independently established truth. Truth is a matter of contingent 
rules operating historically, and is subject to equally contingent epistemological 
breaks occurring at irregular intervals, which disqualify explanation in terms of 
linear developments. Foucault rejects teleology, and he also refuses to 
acknowledge the authority of the subject of knowledge or the author of  
disciplinary forms of knowledge. The subject of knowledge is removed from 
epistemic authority. Rather it is the impersonal discursive formation and the rules 
of operation of knowledge in any epoch that matters.  These rules determine what 
can be thought and said, and how things are to be understood. For Foucault, 
                                                          
21 M. Foucault, The Order of Things (London, Routledge, 1970), p. xxvi 
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meaning is not to be equated with the reflective activities of a human agent 
operating in a self-critical spirit, which may be recovered by a historian.  Given 
that the rules of discourse determine humanity rather than the other way round, at 
the close of the text we are left with the express demise of man.  Foucault sets out 
three periods or epochs in which distinctive epsitemes are operative. An episteme 
that is operative until the end of the 16th Century works with the notion of 
resemblance. Renaissance thought operates through metaphor, and is succeeded 
by the classical episteme of representation, whereby the surfeit of Renaissance 
figurative resemblances between items, is replaced by a representative system of 
signs in which order is formulated and completed. The sign is severed from the 
object with which it corresponds.  The end of the classical period is signalled by 
De Sade’s focus upon desire, which cannot be expressed exactly, its obscurity and 
diffuseness registering the end of the representational system of language. The 
taxonomical imperative of Renaissance knowledge gives way to the latent power 
of forces that lurk beneath the surface. In modern forms of knowledge what 
matters is historicity, finitude and what cannot be represented, hence we deal with 
the notion of value in Ricardo and Marx, which determines the motion of prices. 
The intensity of this preoccupation is evident in modernist literature, notably in 
Proust, Joyce and Woolf, though Foucault detects at the very end of the work how 
the essentialist notions of ‘man’ and ‘humanism’ are receding.22 
The question that is begged by Foucault’s notion of a discursive formation in The Order 
of Things is whether the rules of the discursive formation actually do limit what is 
capable of being said. These rules are only accessible via what is expressed in discourse, 
                                                          




so the thought occurs, at least to me, if we can take the rules to dictate the identity of a 
discourse. More likely the rules merely  reflect how things are said. In The Archaeology 
of Knowledge Foucault replaces the notion of episteme with that of archive, so as to 
allow flexibility, in that an archive informs several and developing discourses. However, 
Foucault’s perspective remains the same in that the rules of discourse are primary, and 
their expression by individual subjects secondary. Again, he sees himself as breaking  
decisively from supervening teleologies of progress. Archives of a given period comprise 
the discourses underpinning fields of knowledge, such as political economy and 
grammar. An archive encompasses practice and social activities, and its formal rules 
constituting a discursive unity, determine discourse . These rules are held to be the rules 
underlying systems of dispersion, which collectively constitute a discursive formation. 
They govern how objects are considered, how strategies are devised and how projects 
are formulated. They also constitute enunciative modalities, which position individual 
subjects in terms of the discursive statements that they are capable of uttering. 
Foucault imagines his perspective to fit with new histories that accentuate 
discontinuities rather than continuities in history, and to undermine the idea of 
continuity in history by destabilising notions of the subject and meaning. He observes,  
‘Continuous history is the indispensable correlative of the folding function of the 
subject- in the form of the historical consciousness.’ 23 Foucault highlights how his 
method serves as an antidote to teleology, observing,  ‘…the series described (in the 
Archaeology of Knowledge), the limits fixed, the comparisons and correlations made are 
based not on the old philosophies of history, but are intended to question teleologies 
and totalizations.’ 24 
                                                          
23 M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London, Tavistock Publications, 1995), p. 12 




If Foucault rejects history as a series of meaningful actions initiated by subjects, he also 
repudiates summative history, which sums up and thereby reduces the diversity of  
historical phenomena. He observes, ‘My aim is decidedly not to use the categories of 
cultural totalities (whiter world views, ideal types, the particular spirit of an age) in 
order to impose on history, despite itself, the forms of structural analysis.’ 25 He warns 
against the contemporary turn to anthropologise Marx so as to render him a  humanist . 
26 If Foucault avoids  totalising history then it is less clear that he avoids the pitfalls of a 
schematic structuralism. He provides an explanation of discourses via rules that he takes 
to govern discourse, but these rules can only be ascertained via analysis of the patterns 
of discourse and may amount to nothing more than contingent symmetries. Foucault 
concentrates on the formal, but does not rule out more concrete  historical 
explanations, but he neither offers a convincing account of discursive change, nor  
explains relations between formal sets of rules and material phenomena. The upshot is 
that his conception of discursive formations appears unduly formal and does not get to 
grips with how the formal and the concrete operate in practice. 27 Foucault is set on 
explaining discourse without relying upon either intended meanings of agents or 
general theories of historical development, but his recourse to formalism appears to 
abandon the concrete historical world of Madness and Civilisation without providing 
convincing links between formal rules and material practice.    
 
                                                          
25 M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London, Tavistock Publications, 1995), p. 15 
26 M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London, Tavistock Publications, 1995), p. 12 




Genealogy, Governmentality and the Political 
 
Discipline and Punish is a departure for Foucault in that he switches his attention from 
formal connections within a discourse to a substantive account of institutions and 
practices. Its engagement with the practical world is emphasised in its opening 
description of the torture and public execution of the regicide, Damiens, in  1757.28 The 
opening sets up a rhetorical contrast between cruel corporeal punishment inflicted in 
the name of the royal authority to a more considered, scientific and apparently humane 
forms of punishment, which is recounted in the rest of the book. Foucault, though, 
highlights how the succeeding forms of punishment, while less overtly cruel are 
insidious in their use of mechanisms of control to monitor and discipline sections of the 
population. Foucault’s approach to history changes along with the change in his object 
of study. He dispenses with the preceding paraphernalia of formal structural historical 
explanations to adopt a genealogical explanation, which tracks the exertion of power 
over bodies. In his essay, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, Foucault observes how a 
genealogy identifies contingent changes, without assuming an origin or goal to the 
historical process. He remarks, ‘History is the concrete body of a development, with its 
moments of intensity, its lapses, its extended periods of feverish agitation, its fainting 
spells; and only a metaphysician would seek its soul in the distant ideality of its 
origin.’29 In Discipline and Punish Foucault shows how the body serves as the site of 
social discipline and the transmission of power. Power, is identified expressly as 
operative in social practice, whereas its role was merely implicit in the Archaeology of 
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Knowledge. Foucault remains opposed to totalizing explanations . Consequently 
Discipline and Punish imagines the development of large-scale disciplinary formations in 
modern Western Society as occurring via a coalescence of contingent factors. The 
resulting disciplinary society In which reason and science is applied to controlling 
populations moulds and constitutes bodies systemically rendering them docile in the 
process. 30 Foucault’s focus on prisons is supplemented by his recognition of the 
simultaneous processes of disciplinary mechanisms being applied in medical asylums 
and hospitals, in schools and in military establishments. Foucault conceives of the 
operations of power as assuming local and multiple forms rather than following from 
central generic planning. A disciplinary society emerges via local overlapping forms of 
control, in which surveillance and discipline are exercised so as to exclude dissonance 
and difference in producing normalised individuals. What Foucault terms the 
microphysics of power relations are constituted by its capillary and internalised forms, 
which circulate in  modern society, and which demand an historical attentiveness to 
detail and contingency. A symbol of the disciplinary society is the Panopticon, 
Bentham's multi-purpose disciplinary institution, which is a paradigm of cost-efficient  
architecture, which lends itself to maximum surveillance by a minimum of guards. 
Disciplinary control was to be optimised by an institutional design that was transferrable 
across the borders of a range of practices, such as education, poor law relief and 
punishment.  
 
Foucault’s originality in the history of ideas resides in a willingness to imagine familiar 
stories from an alternative perspective. The narrative of a progressively more humane 
                                                          





system of punishment is standard and reassuring to the modern Western world. After 
all it is what sets the West apart from Orientalist practices. Yet this story is complicated 
by Foucault’s disconcerting genealogy. Foucault rejects a view of progress. His narrative 
reveals the incommensurability of systems of punishment, so that the brutality of the 
past is not superseded progressively modern more humane regimes. The mechanisms of 
organisational control alter, and punishment assumes a distinct and incommensurable 
form in its regulation of docile normalised behaviour. There is no common scale. 
Foucault’s narrative identifies the contingency and the peculiarity of the forms of power 
exerted in contemporary disciplinary regimes . Throughout his career,  Foucault is a 
critic of an Enlightenment view of progress, and he offers interpretive narratives that 
disturb standard liberal readings of liberal  practices. In Discipline and Punish the  
circulatory forms of disciplinary power are linked to the institutional production of  
docility, via systemic forms of control over the body. Discipline and Punishment serves 
Foucault’s agenda of dismantling unthinking contemporary attitudes to punishment by 
unsettling familiar notions of its provenance. Whereas Bentham provides a rationalist 
account of how a liberal regime might promote maximal utility, Foucault’s interpretive 
practice yields unintended consequences of the enlightened application of technology 
to sections of the population, so that an image of a disciplinary and normalised society 
emerges rather than a rational and utility-maximising one. Likewise Mill’s suspicions of a 
mass society, which demands vigilance and planning on the part of the individual to 
ensure their liberty, are reconstituted if heightened by Foucault’s genealogical survey of 
the unheralded but restrictive operations of a disciplinary society.     
 
In lectures and interviews close to the publication of Discipline and Punish Foucault 
distils from his historical analysis of forms of disciplinary power a more general notion of 
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power. He articulates a theory of the extensive and contingent operations of 
technologies of power, which act directly upon the body and exert control over the 
biological aspects of existence. They exemplify, what he terms bio-power, which is 
conceptualised as at once a productive and repressive  force. In the first volume of his 
genealogical analysis of modern forms of sex and  sexuality, the History of Sexuality, 
Foucault shows how the developing discourse of sexuality shapes productively the 
possibilities of sexual awareness and conduct.31 In a characteristically disturbing move 
he undermines contemporary self-images of the present as well as standard 
representations of the past, by critiquing the prevalent notion that the Victorian era was 
closed to discourse on sex and sexuality whereas the freewheeling contemporary era is 
free in its unfettered exploration of sexuality. Foucault highlights how the Victorian era 
produced an explosion of interest in sex and sexuality, generating proliferating 
discourses, which created the very perversions that its monitoring and disciplinary 
perspective  sought to repress. Discursive  interest in sex is creative in framing the terms 
in which sex is explored, even if the express focus of the Victorian attitude is on the 
repression of sexual phenomena at variance with bio-political normalising requirements 
of heterosexuality and the reproduction of procreative norms. In reviewing nineteenth 
century bourgeois society Foucault remarks, ‘It did not set boundaries for sexuality; it 
extended the various forms of sexuality, pursuing them according to lines of indefinite 
penetration.’32   
 
Foucault attends to the simultaneous creative and repressive aspects of power, which 
produce the creates the very vices and perversions that are to be repressed. The History 
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of Sexuality shows convincingly, if contentiously, how the monitoring and regulating 
processes of normalisation to which individuals are subjected, conduce to the 
production of subjects, whose agency is directed towards the acquisition of appropriate 
sexual attitudes and conduct. In his narrative of this development of sexual norms, 
Foucault articulates a more convincing conceptualisation of subjectivity than he had 
provided previously. Preceding forms of analysis had assumed either a formal structural 
determination of an individual’s discursive repertoire of expressions or the sheer 
domination of the body by disciplinary interventions.  
Foucault’s accommodation of the production of forms of agential subjectivity in the first 
volume of later exploration of the History of Sexuality is accompanied in its later 
volumes by analysis of agonistic forms of resistance to normalising procedures.33 In 
these later volumes individual  subjects are seen as possessing the means to develop 
forms of resistance by exercising a care for  the self, exemplary exercises, which are 
accessed by an analysis of the ethics of the Ancient world.34 
 
In his late analysis of governmentality in his Lectures at the College de France Foucault 
offers historical analyses on the nature of conduct and the conduct of conduct, in which 
power is taken to to be exercised via forms of historically constructed forms of 
subjectivity. In these lectures Foucault provides his most express commentary on forms 
of the history of political thought. While Foucault attends closely to texts, their meaning 
is not assimilated to authorial perspectives but are interpreted in the light of 
theoretically delineated ways of conceiving of historic forms of economy, politics, 
society and the operation of power. In Society Must be Defended- Lectures at  the 
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College de France 1975-76 Foucault reviews retrospectively his histories of madness,  
sexuality and punishment as rehearsing local, capillary forms of power, which differ 
from standard assumptions of political theory, which conceptualise power and its 
operations via analysis of the state.35 The contrast is between perceiving power to 
emanate from a central body, which presumes that, if it is to be limited,  then a 
framework of right must be established to circumscribe central authority, and imagining 
a dispersion of power that, in turn, demands engagement with local practices of 
administration, such as prison and health authorities if conditions are to be altered. In 
Society Must be Defended Foucault contrasts kingly central power and juridical 
authority from an alternative historico-political discourse in which there is a contest or 
war of domination and counter-domination. The latter agonistic battle for power is 
visible in the English Civil War and more generally in early modern Europe. It is distinct 
from and is not presented ideologically in juridico-legal terms. The new form of politics 
is a departure from theories of politics, articulated by Machiavelli and Hobbes, which 
assume the centrality of the state and legal expressions of power. Foucault observes, ‘… 
we think of Machiavelli and we think of Hobbes. I would like to show that they have 
nothing to do with it, that this (new) historico-political discourse cannot be that of the 
Prince’s politics or, obviously that of absolute power…This is basically a discourse that 
cuts off the king’s head.’36   Foucault highlights the difference between the new 
historico-political discourse and the preceding juridico-legal discourse by reviewing 
Hobbes’s Leviathan. In our succeeding chapter on Hobbes we will examine Foucault’s 
interpretation of Hobbes in the light of a critical review of the dichotomy he establishes 
between the two discourses. Foucault is perceptive in observing the tactical and 
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strategic behaviour of Hobbesian individuals, but the observation does not in itself 
undermine the cogency of Hobbes’s argument.  
 
In his subsequent lectures on governmentality, Security, Territory Population and The 
Birth of Biopolitics Foucault reflects on historical examples of the arts of government.37 
Governmentality, for Foucault, is a term, which avoids essentialising the state or a 
particular frame of politics. Just as madness, sexuality and punishment are generic 
conceptual terms that are deconstructed by Foucault’s historical analyses, so his late 
studies of political thought offer contingent changing frameworks of governmentality, 
which situate forms of political thinking that succeed statist notions in the modern era. 
Foucault, throughout his career, is opposed to framing a generic theory of state power, 
either as a way of analysing power or as a context for examining theories of society and 
politics.    In Security, Territory Population Foucault analyses the art of government as it 
is developed in post-Renaissance forms of political theory. Whereas Machiavelli had 
focused upon how a prince might secure a principality by taking appropriate steps to 
secure his grip on juridical sovereignty, Foucault sees subsequent theorists of the 
classical age to be occupied by the wider administration of ‘things’ pertaining to the 
biopolitical welfare  of the territory and people over whom power is exercised. These 
theorists are not concentrating narrowly upon the power of a prince to control his state. 
The point of this subsequent form of governmentality is to influence the conduct of the 
population so as to maximise the development of a territory. In the process of 
promoting biopolitical development, power is exercised via control over the behaviour 
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of subjects. The conduct of these subjects is influenced in turn by pastoral processes 
and institutions, notably by the Church, and politics becomes a way of utilising 
processes of persuasion and influence. Individual subjects internalise schemes for 
conduct. Foucault emphasises how politics is not a universal process of exerting power 
as it responds to and shapes the ways in which politics itself is enacted. In highlighting 
the historicity of forms of political power, he observes, ‘But the state, doubtless no 
more today than in the past, does not have this unity, individuality and rigorous 
functionality,  nor I would go so far as to say, this importance. After all, maybe the state 
is only a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction whose importance is much less 
than we think. What is important for our modernity, that is to say, our present, is not 
then the state’s takeover of society, so much as what I would call the 
“governmentalisation” of the state.’38 
 
In The Birth of Biopolitics interprets the rise of the discourse of political economy and 
the concomitant idea of the conceptual separation of a sphere of the ‘economy’ from 
non-economic social and political phenomena as allowing for a new and hitherto 
undeveloped from of political theory, namely liberalism. Liberalism operates as a 
particular style of governmentality, in that it presumes and fosters a natural sphere of 
society, where the market and purely economic operations can take place. This idea of a 
separate or natural sphere of the economy is susceptible to multiple associations and it 
is not to be assimilated to a primitive or prior condition.  What is natural about market 
operations is neither a condition that precedes an elaborated social and political state 
nor  an acultural condition. Liberalism is a multivalent ideology that invokes multiple 
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forms of rhetorical justification. On the one hand, liberal politics is aligned with and 
justified by a pre-existing  juridico-political analysis of politics, whereby the centrality of 
political authority is assumed. Politics is assumed to be about the state and its authority 
and yet in a liberal formulation state power is subjected to a critical discourse, whereby, 
as in Locke’s proto-liberal argument , governmental power is limited by the presumption 
that it must be aligned to natural rights. 39  In contrast to the Lockean standpoint, there 
is what can be termed a utilitarian perspective, in which the rights of subjects are not 
invoked and naturalised, but rather, the interests of society are identified and asserted 
so as to highlight the direction in which government  should be turned. Government is 
about maximising social utility, which is articulated in terms of the promotion of social 
interests. Foucault maintains,’ In short, this approach consists in the analysis of 
government: its practice, its de facto limits, and its desirable limits…The question 
addressed to government at every moment of its action and with regard to each of its 
institutions, old or new is:  Is it useful? This is not the original, the revolutionary 
question: What are my original rights and how can I assert them against any sovereign?  
But it is the radical question. The question of English radicalism; the problem English 
radicalism is the problem of utility.’40 Foucault imagines liberalism to support a 
programme of governmentality that operates with a realm of interests in society, which 
are taken to be distinct from government, but which are enabled and promoted by the 
arts of liberal government. Liberals are taken to standardly maintain that government 
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can and should provide conditions of security, which are central to the flourishing of 
market conditions. 
 
Foucault’s conception of the dyadic nature of liberal forms of ideological justification is 
contextualised by an interpretation of the development of modern society and politics. 
Liberalism appears when markets are seen to operate via an autonomous logic and to 
be linked to social interests, as is theorised by the political economy of Smith. Foucault’s 
interpretation of liberalism and his related reading of its contextual conditions by which 
society and politics are conceived as susceptible to distinct and context-dependent 
forms of political logic, highlights how he locates and interprets political theorists in 
specific historical frames or discourses. Foucault’s contextualism is formulated 
retrospectively in terms that are distinct from those that are maintained by past 
theorists themselves. In The Birth of Biopolitics Foucault also sets out an historical 
understanding of the development of forms of neo-liberalism. He connects the 
discourse of neo-liberalism, which was developing in the late 1970s, to the arguments of 
the ordoliberals, a group of political economists and social theorists, who were centred 
around the University of Freiburg during the Weimar Republic. The dark times of inter-
war Germany served as the context of theorists, who reflected on the nature of  
markets and considered ways to revive markets and society, which floundered under 
the impact of successive events, reparations, hyper- inflation and subsequently 
depression . Foucault identifies the impact of the ordo-liberals upon Erhard and the 
constitutive political rhetoric of the West German Constitution in 1949. The continuing 
influence of the ordo-liberals is also traced to the anarcho-liberalism of Chicago via and 




The ordoliberals were responding to conditions, which had been produced by an 
increasing activity of government, which was intent upon forestalling the contemporary 
threats of socialism and fascism. The activity of government, its impact upon economic 
and social practices, was diagnosed as impairing and clogging markets, rather than 
achieving its intended outcomes of protecting and fostering markets. The ordo-liberals, 
according to Foucault, perceived Nazism not to represent an aberrant and hyper 
mixture of ill-assorted ingredients but as maintaining and concentrating prevalent 
general features of public policy. Nazism, and the elements of current public policy, 
which it adopted, are taken to be fatal to liberalism. The concoction of Keynsianism, 
planning, state-power, the dismantling of juridical checks on state power, the reduction 
of individuals to component parts of a national social community are all diagnosed as 
undermining the tenets of liberalism.41 These elements of public policy, which were 
concentrated in Nazism, were problematic individually, but collectively they demanded 
a radical rethinking of society and liberalism.  The ordoliberals imagine Nazism as 
dramatizing the defects of counter-liberal measures, which depend upon the application 
of technologies to the economy and society. The conclusion of ordo-liberal reflection is 
that the enhancement of state power has to be reversed, because, or so it is 
maintained, market society has never been allowed to flourish. Ameliorative measures, 
which reverse the trend towards the heightening of state powers, are demanded. What 
must be achieved, in Foucault’s interpretation of ordo-liberal thinking, is  ‘… a state 
under the supervision of the market rather than a market supervised by the state.’42 In 
re-imagining society and market operations ordoliberals identify competition rather 
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than exchange to serve as the crucial underlying principle of market behaviour. It is not 
enough for exchange to take place, and for governments to operate so as to release 
transactions from governmental interference. Markets are not simply imagined to 
operate maximally by governments exercising restraint and adopting laissez faire 
policies. Competition is crucial and is to be cultivated. It is imagined according to its 
formal properties so that the force of competition will integrate and co-ordinate society. 
Competition,  on this neo-liberal reading, is vital and is to be enabled by governmental 
policy that releases the restraints of  monopoly, which are diagnosed as arising not from 
market failure but from political interventions. Again, governmental engagement with 
society is to be  
 market but suppotting it. A transfer of income might happen but not to fundamentally 
change things. Likewise individuals shoul be enabled to take responsibility for provision 
of their care.   mere exchangepon  state power such as Locke invoked the rights of man 
to stand against an overly powerful central political power. Utility…be       
What Foucault offers to the history of political ideas is a challenge to the temptations of 
conventional treatments that assimilate the past to the present either by taking terms 
such as politics, punishment, sexuality, power and reason at face value or by seeing past 
forms as leading inexorably  to the present.  Foucault highlighted the relativity of terms 
and he opposed reading ideas as straightforwardly representing the intentional views of 
authors. In his ‘What is an Author?’ he characteristically historicises authorship in 
reviewing the historicity of the term whereas pre-modern science celebrates the 
individual author of treaties and sees literary forms as embedded within traditions, 
modern notions of science highlight the co-operative movement of science while 
individual literary authors are lionised. Foucault’s perspective certainly offers directions 
in which historians of political thought  can go to challenge received notions. If Hegel’s 
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historical teleology embraces all forms of political thinking in the embrace of a 
supervening coherence, Foucault smashes at the door of the absolute, reminding 
readers of the changing and incommensurable ways in which power has been exercised. 
If Locke and Kant celebrate the man of wisdom, Foucault makes us look at the 
constructed nature of sexual identity and the dichotomous reading of reason an 
unreason that leaves the mad in the wilderness of the asylum or lost in the ‘community.’ 
Moreover, Derrida’s reading of texts is challenged by Foucault’s analysis of the micro-
physics of power evident in the wider social sphere. Again Marx’s focus upon the 
determination of social and political power via class and economic dominance in the 
productive process is challenged by the focus upon a wider set of discursive processes. 
And Gadamer’s confidence in a dialogue between interpretation of particular historic 
texts and tradition is shown to be vulnerable to Gadamer’s own critique of 
Enlightenment notions of univocal forms of reason. 
